US plans to partition Iraq have been on the back burner for almost two decades. Now the future of the Arab world for generations to come hangs on whether or not they succeed, writes Galal Nassar

October 11, 2007

The fig leaf has fallen. US claims that the occupation of Iraq would be a prelude to the modernisation of the region and the spread of democracy now ring hollow even to the most fervent one-time believers. The US Senate has at long last stated its intentions in no uncertain terms. They are intentions that confirm our worst nightmare.

Two weeks ago, the Senate voted 75-23 for a plan recommending the partitioning of Iraq. The plan was championed by Joseph Biden, a democratic presidential hopeful and head of the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee. It calls for Iraq to be partitioned into Kurdish, Shia, and Sunni regions. The partitioning, we are told, would end the violence, reduce chaos, and make it easier for US forces to redeploy and confront "terror" more effectively. Republican congressmen claim that such a move would do for Iraq what the Dayton Accords (that divided Bosnia into Serbian, Croatian, and Bosnian enclaves) did for Bosnia.

The recent carnage at Nusur Square in Baghdad, and ongoing mayhem in other parts of the country, cannot be viewed in isolation from the partition plan. Not that there is anything particularly new in the idea: Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski (both former national security advisers) have been mooting the creation of mini-states in the region since the 1960s. The plan to partition Iraq has also diverted attention from the Nusur Square carnage committed by Blackwater contractors two weeks ago.

Since Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990 attempts have been made to weaken the state through international blockades as well as through the revival of ethnic and factional alliances.

There is a surreal aspect to the tragedy unfolding in Iraq today. First, the Iraqi state had become synonymous with the regime of Saddam Hussein. It was argued that removal of the "dictatorial" central state -- through partitioning -- was the best way of governing the country and eliminating terrorists. Sweeping aside all the factors that had made Iraq what it was -- a mosaic of minority communities -- partitioning was offered as the only way ahead. It was helped by the country's structural weakness and the failure of Iraq's first democratic attempt to defend the rights of the Kurds. Since the creation of the Iraqi state nationality laws have left much to be desired and the army's interference in politics worked to reinforce the regime's propensity for despotism.

The Senate's partitioning plan should come as no surprise. The desire to split the Arab world into mini- states surfaced immediately after the 1973 War, when it became clear that the Arabs were capable of standing up for themselves and challenging the Zionist project. The Arabs then used their wealth to promote national and regional interests. The use of oil as a means of pressure -- regardless of the motives that emerged later -- proved that the Arabs were capable of acting in unison if left alone. The then secretary of state Henry Kissinger responded by arguing that the US should do everything within its means to ensure that Israel remained the strongest force in the region. His remarks didn't attract much comment in an Arab world used to Washington's unquestioning backing of Israel.

Following the 1973 War, US experts concluded that the partition of Arab states would have spin-off benefits. It would not only preclude the formation of an Arab military force capable of confronting the Zionist scheme but provide opportunities to foment disputes over land and interests, making it easier for outsiders to control the region's oil fields. Playing on sectarian and ethnic sentiments would act to weaken the social fabric and ensuing inter-Arab rivalries could prompt locals to seek the help and protection of major powers, including the US. Last but not least, the division of the Arab world would ensure the Middle East remained a docile market, and petrodollars could be recycled back into the coffers of oil-consuming nations.

Jimmy Carter's administration did the sums and decided to form a rapid deployment force. News started coming in about military manoeuvres in Arizona and Nevada, in terrain similar to that of oil-producing Arab countries. Later joint US-Arab manoeuvres were conducted on Arab soil. Journals close to US decision makers began to speak of Iraq as a soft target: its occupation, US writers argued, could serve as a prelude to guaranteeing control of its oil resources.

In January 1990 The Nation predicted a war by the end of that year over Gulf oil resources. Following the Gulf war, and during preparations for the Madrid peace conference, US secretary of state James Baker predicted the political map of the region would change more dramatically than it had after World War I -- i.e. after the Sykes-Picot agreement and the Balfour Declaration. Again the remarks went largely unnoticed, as did a paper leaked by US intelligence services, "Succession in Saudi Arabia," which outlined plans to split the kingdom.

The first practical step the US administration took towards partitioning Iraq came in the early 1990s, with the imposition of no-fly zones. Soon afterwards president Bill Clinton expanded the no-fly zones in the south and the north on the pretext of protecting the Kurds and Shias. These zones provided the blueprint for a future political map of Iraq. At a single stroke Kurdish areas had been moved out of the reach of Baghdad's central government.

Following 9/11, US officials started promoting creative chaos as a tool in their war on terror, hinting at possible strikes against up to 15 Arab and Muslim countries. Simultaneously, a strategic research institute affiliated with the Rand Corporation published a report, Major Strategy, which discussed in detail plans to divide the Arab world. The report viewed the occupation of Iraq as a step towards subjugating all Arab countries. It even mentioned the possibility of US strikes against Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

Iraq, occupied amid promises of a democratic dawn, has been thrown into a backwardness it hasn't known for centuries. Sectarianism and ethnic loyalties have been revived. The first transitional council was formed along ethnic and sectarian lines. Senior posts were divided according to quotas designed to erase the country's Arab and Islamic identity, and the US-inspired constitution's interpretation of federalism bordered on an endorsement of partition.

Over the past few months US researchers have concluded that partitioning Iraq is the only way for the Bush administration to escape its current fix. What matters for the US administration, it now transpires, is not the future of Iraq or the interests of its people but the safety of the occupiers. In its July 2006 edition, the US armed forces magazine spoke of a "blood map" dividing the Arab world along ethnic and sectarian lines. The scheme was already in action in Palestine, Lebanon, Sudan, and Somalia. Iraq is unlikely to be the last venue for its implementation.

The partition of Iraq represents one more rung on the ladder to creative chaos. It is a criminal act that surpasses, in its insidiousness, any crimes the US administration has so far committed in Iraq. And it opens the way for the implementation of other suspect schemes mentioned in the Major Strategy report.

To oppose such plans is an act of self-defence. Not to do so places the safety, security, stability, and future of Arab states at risk. The Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916 paved the way for the partition of the Arab world after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. The Balfour Declaration spelled the demise of Palestine. In 1992 Rand scholar Graham Fuller asked, "Will Iraqi remain united?"

The answer to his question holds the key to the future of the Middle East.