February 18, 2008
Across this last weekend, the Western
propaganda machine was working overtime, celebrating the latest
NATO miracle: the transformation of Serbian Kosovo into Albanian
Kosova. A shameless land grab by the United States, which used
the Kosovo problem to install an enormous military base (Camp
Bondsteel) on other people's strategically located land, is transformed
by the power of the media into an edifying legend of "national
liberation".
For the unhappy few who know the complicated truth about Kosovo,
the words of Aldous Huxley seem most appropriate: "You shall
know the truth, and the truth shall drive you mad."
Concerning Kosovo, truth is like letters written in the sand
as the tsunami of propaganda comes thundering in. The truth
is available--for instance in George Szamuely's thoroughly informative
piece last Friday here on CounterPunch.
Fragments of the truth sometimes even show up in the mainstream
media, mostly in letters from readers. But hopeless as it is
to try to turn back the tide of officially endorsed legend, let
me examine just one drop in this unstoppable sea of propaganda:
a column by Roger Cohen entitled "Europe's new state",
published in the Valentine's Day edition of the International
Herald Tribune.
Cohen's op ed piece is fairly
typical in the dismissive way it deals with Milosevic, Russia
and the Serbs. Cohen writes: "Slobodan Milosevic, the late
dictator, set Serbia's murderous nationalist tide in motion on
April 24, 1987, when he went to Kosovo to declare that Serbian
'ancestors would be defiled' if ethnic Albanians had their way."
I don't know where Roger Cohen
got that quotation, but it is not to be found in the speech Milosevic
made that day in Kosovo. And certainly, Milosevic did not go
to Kosovo to declare any such thing, but to consult with local
Communist League officials in the town of Kosovo Polje about
the province's serious economic and social problems. Aside from
the province's chronic poverty, unemployment, and mismanagement
of development funds contributed from the rest of Yugoslavia,
the main social problem was the constant exodus of Serb and Montenegrin
inhabitants under pressure from ethnic Albanians. At the time,
this problem was reported in leading Western media.
For instance, as early as July
12, 1982, Marvine Howe reported to the New York Times
that Serbs were leaving Kosovo by the tens of thousands because
of discrimination and intimidation on the part of the ethnic
Albanian majority:
"The [Albanian] nationalists
have a two-point platform," according to Beci Hoti, an executive
secretary of the Communist Party of Kosovo, "first to establish
what they call an ethnically clean Albanian republic and then
the merger with Albania to form a greater Albania.
Mr Hoti, an Albanian, expressed
concern voer political pressures that were forcing Serbs to leave
Kosovo. "What is important now," he said, "is
to establish a climate of security and create confidence."
And seven months after Milosevic's
visit to Kosovo, David Binder reported in the New York Times
(November 1, 1987):
Ethnic Albanians in the Government
[of Kosovo] have manipulated public funds and regulations to
take over land belonging to Serbs. Slavic Orthodox churches
have been attacked, and flags have been torn down. Wells have
been poisoned and crops burned. Slavic boys have been knifed,
and some young ethnic Albanians have been told by their elders
to rape Serbian girls.
The goal of the radical nationals
among them, one said in an interview, is an "ethnic Albania
that includes western Macedonia, southern Montenegro, part of
southern Serbia, Kosovo and Albania itself."
As Slavs flee the protracted
violence, Kosovo is becoming what ethnic Albanian nationalists
have been demanding for years, and especially strongly since
the bloody rioting by ethnic Albanians in Pristina in 1981--an
"ethnically pure" Albanian region
This was in fact the first
instance of "ethnic cleansing" in post-World War II
Yugoslavia, as reported in The New York Times and other
Western media, and the victims were the Serbs. The cult of "memory"
has become a contemporary religion, but some memories are more
equal than others. In the 1990s, the New York Times evidently
forgot completely what it had said about Kosovo in the 1980s.
Why? Perhaps because meanwhile, the Soviet bloc had collapsed
and the unity of independent, non-aligned Yugoslavia was no longer
in the strategic interest of the United States.
Back to Milosevic in Kosovo
Polje on April 24, 1987. An incident occurred when local police
(under an Albanian-dominated Communist League government) attacked
Serbs who had gathered to protest lack of legal protection. Milosevic
famously told them, spontaneously: "No one should beat you
any more!" If this is "extreme nationalism",
perhaps there should be more of it.
But nowhere do I find a trace
of the statement attributed to Milosevic by Cohen. In his speech
to local party delegates that followed, which is on the public
record, Milosevic referred to the "regrettable incident"
and promised an investigation. He went on to stress that "we
should not allow the misfortunes of people to be exploited by
nationalists, whom every honest person must combat. We must
not divide people between Serbs and Albanians, but rather we
should separate, on the one hand, decent people who struggle
for brotherhood, unity and ethnic equality, and, on the other
hand, counter-revolutionaries and nationalists."
I turn again to Aldous Huxley
for comfort: "Facts do not cease to exist because they are
ignored."
But Huxley also said: "Great
is truth, but still greater, from a practical point of view,
is silence about truth. By simply not mentioning certain subjects...
totalitarian propagandists have influenced opinion much more
effectively than they could have by the most eloquent denunciations."
Last Tuesday in Geneva, Russian
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov tried to convey to journalists
his grave concern about the way the United States was handling
the Kosovo problem.
"We are speaking here about the subversion of all the foundations
and principles of international law, which have been won and
established as a basis of Europe's existence at huge effort,
and at the cost of pain, sacrifice and bloodletting," he
said.
"Nobody can offer a clear plan of action in the case of
a chain reaction [of further declarations of unilateral independence].
It turns out that they [the United States and its NATO allies]
are planning to act in a hit or miss fashion on an issue of paramount
importance. This is simply inadmissible and irresponsible,"
the Russian diplomat said. "I sincerely fail to comprehend
the principles guiding our American colleagues, and those Europeans
who have taken up this position," he added.
Roger Cohen dismisses such
considerations in five words: "the Russian bear will growl".
Russia, he adds, "will scream. But it's backed the wrong
horse." There are no issues here, no principles. Just
growling and gambling. "Milosevic rolled the dice of genocidal
nationalism and lost", says Cohen.
This is not only a false statement, it is a grotesquely meaningless
metaphor. Milosevic tried to suppress an armed secessionist
movement, secretly but effectively supported by neighboring Albania,
the United States and Germany, which deliberately provoked repression
by murdering both Serbs and Albanians loyal to the government.
Like the Americans in similar circumstances, Milosevic relied
too heavily on military superiority rather than on political
skill. But even the NATO-sponsored International Criminal Tribunal
for Former Yugoslavia in The Hague had to abandon any charges
of "genocide" against Milosevic in Kosovo. For the
simple reason that there was never a shred of evidence for such
a charge.
Milosevic is no longer alive,
and Russia is far away. But what about the Serbs who still live
in the historic part of Serbia called Kosovo? Cohen takes care
of that problem in a few words: "Some of the 120,000 Serbs
in Kosovo may hit the road."
As Aldous Huxley pointed out, "The propagandist's purpose
is to make one set of people forget that certain other sets of
people are human."
Then you can tell them to "hit the road".
The "Unique"
Case
Russia has warned that Kosovo
independence will set a dangerous precedent, encouraging other
ethnic minorities to follow the example of the Albanians and
demand secession and an independent State. The United States
has dismissed such concerns by flatly asserting that Kosovo is
"unique". Well yes, Kosovo is a unique case, and is
the only one recognized by the United States until the next
"unique case" comes along. When legal criteria have
been thrown out, we just have one "unique case" after
another.
The "uniqueness"
claimed by the United States is a propaganda construction. It
is based on the supposed "uniqueness" of Milosevic's
repression of the armed secessionist movement, which was not
unique at all. It was standard operating procedure throughout
history and the world over, in such circumstances. Deplorable,
no doubt, but not unique. It was minor indeed compared to the
similar but endless and far bloodier anti-insurgency operations
in Colombia, Sri Lanka, and Chechnya, not to mention Northern
Ireland, Thailand, the Philippines And unlike the counter-insurgency
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, which kill incomparably more
civilians, it was carried out by the legal, democratically elected
government of the country, rather than by a foreign power.
The propaganda "uniqueness"
is an abstraction. Like every place on earth, Kosovo is indeed
unique. But in ways that have nothing to do with the U.S. pretext
for taking it over and turning it into a military outpost of
empire.
To know how a place is unique,
you have to be interested in it.
I have not visited Kosovo since
before the 1999 NATO war. On one occasion, in August 1997, I
drove around the province in a failing Skoda, at my own expense,
just looking. Driving in Kosovo was a bit risky, partly because
of the number of dead dogs in the road, and mostly because of
local drivers' habit of passing slower vehicles on hills and
curves. In northern Kosovo, just outside the town of Zubin Potok,
this habit produced one of its inevitable consequences: a head-on
collision with serious casualties, which shut down the two-lane
highway for hours while ambulances and police sorted things out.
Unable to proceed toward Pristina,
I drove back to Zubin Potok to pass the time on the shaded terrace
of a roadside restaurant. I was the only customer, and the lone
waiter, a tall, handsome young man named Milomir, gladly accepted
my invitation to sit down at my table and chat as I sipped glass
after glass of delicious strawberry juice.
Milomir was happy to talk to
someone familiar with the French city of Metz, which he had visited
as a student and remembered fondly. He loved to read and travel,
but in 1991 he got married and now had two small daughters to
support. Job prospects were poor, even though he had been to
university, so he had no choice but to stay in Zubin Potok.
As for Europe, even if he could get a visa (impossible for Serbs
anyway), he spoke no language more Western than his mother tongue,
Serbo-Croatian. He had studied Russian (he loved the literature)
and Albanian as his foreign languages. He learned Albanian in
order to be able to communicate with the majority in Kosovo.
But such communication was difficult. Milomir was very much
in favor of a bilingual society, and thought everyone in Kosovo
should learn both Serbian and Albanian, but unfortunately this
was not the case. The younger generation of Albanians refused
to speak Serbian and learned English instead.
The town of Zubin Potok was located near the dam on the Ibar
River built in the late 1970s to create hydraulic power. Coming
from Novi Pazar, I had driven along the 35-kilometer-long artificial
lake created by the dam, looking in vain for a nice place to
stop. It seemed that there must have been villages along the
Ibar River before the dam was built, and I asked Milomir about
this. Yes, he said, the artificial lake had flooded a score
of old villages, of ethnically mixed, but mostly Serb population.
The Albanian Communist authorities in Pristina had resettled
the Serbs outside of Kosovo, around the town of Kraljevo. There
were about 10,000 of them.
This was a minor example of
the administrative measures taken to decrease the Serb population
during the period, before Milosevic, when Albanians were running
the province through the local Communist League.
Milomir was not complaining,
but simply answering my questions. He did not go too often (by
bus--he had no car) to the nearest large city, Mitrovica, because
he was afraid of being beaten by Albanians. This was just a
fact of life, at a time when (according to Western media) Albanians
in Kosovo were being terrorized by Serbian repression.
While we were chatting, a friend
of his came along and the conversation turned to politics. There
was a presidential campaign underway. The two young men wanted
to know which candidate I thought would be best for Serbia in
the eyes of the world. Milomir was tending toward Vuk Draskovic,
and his friend was for Vojislav Kostunica. Neither would dream
of voting for either Milosevic or Seselj, the nationalist leader
of the Radical Party.
Zubin Potok
Today
I have no idea what has become
of Milomir, his wife, his two daughters, or his friend. Zubin
Potok is the western-most municipality in the heavily Serb-populated
north of Kosovo. From the internet I learn that the population
of Zubin Potok municipality (including surrounding villages)
has nearly doubled since I passed through. It now comes to approximately
14,900, including about 3,000 internally displaced Serbs (from
other areas of Kosovo where the Albanian majority has driven
them out), 220 Serbian refugees from Croatia and 800 Albanians.
The local assembly is overwhelmingly dominated by Kostunica's
Democratic Party of Serbia, but includes two Kosovo Albanian
representatives.
Up until now, schools, hospitals,
and other public services, as well as the local economy, have
continued to function thanks mainly to subsidies from Belgrade.
The Albanian declaration of Kosovo independence will create
a crisis by demanding an end to such vital subsidies--which,
however, an "independent Kosovo" is unable to replace.
Moreover, bands of Albanian nationalists are declaring that
Zubin Potok "is Albanian" and must be "liberated
from the Serbs". They can be seen on You Tube, using the
Statue of Liberty as their symbol, and threatening Serbs in Albanian
rap.
The European Union is moving in to provide law and order. But
the "order" they claim to be protecting is the one
defined by the Albanian nationalists. What does that mean to
people like Milomir and his little family?
For Roger Cohen, the answer
is easy: "hit the road!"
Serbia, by the way, already
has the largest number of refugees in Europe, victims of "ethnic
cleansing" in Croatia and Kosovo. And Serbs cannot get
visas or refugee status in Western Europe. They have been labeled
the "bad guys". Only their enemies can be "victims".
Before
and After
Kosovo before the NATO war
and occupation was, nevertheless, a multiethnic society. The
accusation of "apartheid" was simply Albanian propaganda,
as the Albanian nationalist leaders chose to use that heavily-charged
term to describe their own boycott of Serbs and Serb institutions.
Every police action against an Albanian, for whatever reason,
whether for suspicion of armed rebellion or for ordinary crime,
was described as a "human rights violation" by the
Albanian human rights network financed by the United States government.
It was an extraordinary situation that the Serbian and Yugoslav
governments allowed an illegal separatist "government of
Kosovo", headed by Ibrahim Rugova, to hold shop in the center
of Pristina, regularly receiving foreign journalists and regaling
them with tales of how oppressed they were by the horrid Serbs.
But the laws were the same
for all citizens, there were Albanians in local government and
in the police, and if there were cases of police brutality (in
what country are there no cases of police brutality?), the Albanians
at least had nothing to fear from their Serb neighbors.
Even then, it was the Serbs who were afraid of the Albanians.
Only outside Kosovo could anyone seriously believe that it was
the Albanians who were under threat of "ethnic cleansing"
(much less "genocide"). Such a project was simply,
obviously, out of the question. It was the Serbs who were afraid,
who spoke of sending their children to safety if they had the
means, or who spoke bravely of remaining "no matter what".
Later, in March 1999, when NATO began to bomb Kosovo, Albanians
fled by the hundreds of thousands, and their temporary flight
from the war theater was presented as the justification for the
bombing that caused it. The press did not bother to report on
the Serbs and others who also fled the bombing at that time.
In Kosovo, in 1987, in Pristina
and Pec, I observed a peculiar sort of group behavior that reminds
me only of school playgrounds in Maryland in my childhood. A
gang of kids get together and by various signs, body language,
and a minimum of words, convey to some outsiders that they are
excluded and despised. I have seen Albanians act in this way
toward stray Serbs, especially old women. This variety of "mobbing"
was not violent in 1987, but turned so after NATO occupied the
territory. It was encouraged by the official NATO stamp of approval
of Albanian hatred for Serbs, delivered by bombs in the spring
of 1999.
Of course, there must have
been Serbs who hated Albanians. But in my limited, chance experience,
what struck me was the absence of hatred for Albanians among
Serbs I met. Fear, yes, but not hatred. A great deal of perplexity.
Sister Fotina at the Gracanica monastery had a very Christian
explanation. We tried to help the Albanians care for their many
children, she said, and yet they turn against us. This must
be God's way of punishing us for turning away from Christianity
during the time of Communism, she concluded. She blamed her
fellow Serbs more than the Albanians.
The divine punishment has not
been confined to Christians, however. In the southernmost corner
of Kosovo live an ancient population called Gorani (meaning mountain
people), who converted to Islam under the Ottoman Empire, like
most of the Albanians. But their language is Serbian, and this
is unacceptable to the Albanians. Estimates vary, but it is
agreed that at least two thirds of the Gorani have left since
NATO "liberation". Pressure and intimidation have taken
various forms. Albanians have moved into the temporarily vacant
homes of Gorani who went to Austria and Germany to earn money
for their retirement. The NATO-protected Albanian authorities
have found ways to deprive Gorani children of schooling in the
Serbian language. In the main Gorani town of Dragash, an Albanian
mob attacked the health center and caused health workers to flee.
Then, last January 5, a powerful explosion destroyed the bank
in Dragash. It was the only Serbian bank still allowed to operate
in the south of Kosovo, and served mainly to transfer the pensions
that allowed local Gorani to survive.
As usual, the crime went unpunished.
David Binder, who used to report
on Yugoslavia for the New York Times, before he was excluded
for knowing too much, reported last November * on a long investigation
of conditions in Kosovo commissioned by the German Bundeswehr.
The existence of this report is proof that the Western governments,
while publicly claiming that Kosovo is "ready for independence",
know quite well that this is not true. Among other things, Binder
reports:
The institute authors, Mathias
Jopp and Sammi Sandawi, spent six months interviewing 70 experts
and mining current literature on Kosovo in preparing the study.
In their analysis the political unrest and guerrilla fighting
of the 1990s led to basic changes which they call a "turnabout
in Kosovo-Albanian social structures." The result is a "civil
war society in which those inclined to violence, ill-educated
and easily influenced people could make huge social leaps in
a rapidly constructed soldateska."
"It is a Mafia society"
based on "capture of the state" by criminal elements.
In the authors' definition,
Kosovan organized crime "consists of multimillion-Euro organizations
with guerrilla experience and espionage expertise." They
quote a German intelligence service report of "closest ties
between leading political decision makers and the dominant criminal
class" and name Ramush Haradinaj, Hashim Thaci and Xhavit
Haliti as compromised leaders who are "internally protected
by parliamentary immunity and abroad by international law."
They scornfully quote the UNMIK
chief from 2004-2006, Soeren Jessen Petersen, calling Haradinaj
"a close and personal friend." The study sharply criticizes
the United States for "abetting the escape of criminals"
in Kosovo as well as "preventing European investigators
from working."
It notes "secret CIA detention
centers" at Camp Bondsteel and assails American military
training for Kosovo (Albanian) police by Dyncorp, authorized
by the Pentagon.
In an aside, it quotes one unidentified official as saying of
the American who is deputy chief of UNMIK, "The main task
of Steve Schook is to get drunk once a week with Ramush Haradinaj."
Who Goes
and Who Stays
Schook has been fired by UNMIK,
but UNMIK, the nominally United Nations mission, is being taken
over arbitrarily by the European Union. The EU "mission"
is a sort of colonial government which, alongside NATO, plans
to govern the ungovernable Albanian territory. However, already
movements of armed Albanian patriots are planning their next
"war of liberation" against the Europeans.
So, after the Serbs, the Roma,
the Gorani, will the Europeans have to "hit the road"?
Only the Americans seem sure of staying. Ensconced in their
gigantic "Camp Bondsteel", they control the strategic
routes from Serbia to Greece, and incidentally offer the mass
of unemployed Kosovo Albanians their best-paying employment opportunities,
notably by taking menial and dangerous jobs serving U.S. forces
in Iraq or Afghanistan.
The reality of this shameless
land-grab is available to all. I have written about it, Binder
has written about it, Szamuely has written about it, many Germans
have written about it. The Russians, the Greeks, the Rumanians,
the Slovaks and many others know about it. But in the Brave
New World Order, it does not exist. People don't know.
I leave the last word to Aldous Huxley:
"Most ignorance is vincible
ignorance. We don't know because we don't want to know."
(* The Binder story can be
found at http://www.balkanalysis.com/)
Diana Johnstone is the author of Fools'
Crusade: Yugoslavia, NATO and Western Delusion (Monthly Review
Press.) She can be reached at diana.josto@yahoo.fr